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## 1 APPEARANCES CONTINUED: 2 MORRIS NICHOLS ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP RODGER D. SMITH, II, ESQUIRE 3 -and-4 ALSTON & BIRD 5 ANDREW LIGOTTI, ESQUIRE BY: BY: NATALIE C. CLAYTON, ESQUIRE 6 For the Defendant 7 PROCEEDINGS \*\*\* 8 9 THE COURT: All right. Good afternoon, 10 everybody. It's Magistrate Judge Sherry Fallon, and I'm 11 ready to proceed in Ethanol Boosting Systems, et al versus Ford Motor Company. We have a number of issues to address 12 in a discovery dispute. We'll start with the appearances of 13 14 counsel. 15 Who's with you, Mr. Farnan? 16 MR. FARNAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Andres 17 Healy and William O'Connell of Susman Godfrey. 18 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. And for the defendant, Ford? 19 20 MR. SMITH: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Rodger 21 Smith at Morris Nichols, along with Natalie Clayton and Andy Ligotti from Alston & Bird. 22 23 THE COURT: All right then. Since I received 24 the moving submission from the plaintiffs first at Docket 25 Item Number 54, we'll start with the plaintiffs' issues.

Four have been outlined in the submission. And I did get the letter, by the way, yesterday about the inadvertent attachment as exhibits of certain exhibits that were privileged and clawed back. So I received that as well.

Let's begin. I'll turn it over to the plaintiffs.

MR. O'CONNELL: Thank you, Your Honor. This is Bill O'Connell at Susman Godfrey. I'll be addressing the affirmative issues raised by Pontiac today.

THE COURT: Okay. Very good.

MR. O'CONNELL: To begin, Your Honor, there are four issues as Your Honor saw in our letters. First, Ford is refusing to run search terms for eight of the ten document custodians that it selected in this case. And we urge this Court to require them to use search terms in negotiation with us, and also to provide term-specific hit counts for all its custodians.

The second issue I'll be addressing is that Ford must produce the documents about its copy with pride program, including documents from Mr. Hau Thai-Tang.

The third issue is that Ford must produce a manifest for the source code that relates to the fuel management system in the accused product. And in the source code that it's now agreeing to provide relating to the PFDIM F\_HLD program, also include any program that interacts with

the modules so that we don't come to Your Honor with a similar dispute one month down the line.

And fourth, Ford must produce the missing technical documents that plaintiffs identified, including those relating to governmental testing which are all identified in Paragraph 9 of the affidavit of Richard Davis which is Exhibit C to our opening submission.

And we'd ask the Court to order the production of these materials by September 25th.

On the first issue of ESI searches, Your Honor,

Ford needs to be ordered to engage in a collection and

review process that involves search terms that are

negotiated with plaintiffs for determining eight custodians.

In this case, what Ford did is exactly what a party should

not do to collect responsive ESI.

It had the custodians themselves review the documents and select those documents that it believed to be relevant. That method is deficient for obvious reasons, including both because it invites mistakes and significantly increases the chances that a custodian may not disclose a particularly damaging document to Ford's case.

Letting these custodians judge what is relevant or not relevant is really letting the fox guard the henhouse. There is also no reason to have the custodians themselves decide what's relevant.

It's standard practice, on a large scale case like this that involves ESI, to run search terms. And Ford's refusal to run those search terms really serves no purpose other than hiding responsive documents.

But Your Honor, much of an issue of a custodian possibly withholding the damaging documents, it's also one of practicality. Even the most informed, even the most well-intentioned custodians simply can't go through six years of emails and electronic documents and correctly identify the responsive ones without running search terms.

Moreover, these are documents that are held by witnesses who are not trivial to this case. These are eight of the ten custodians that Ford itself selected as being relevant to the litigation. The issue with that is the trusted key witnesses whose job prospects are tied to this technology to review their own documents and disclose both the good and the bad without the use of search terms is simply inviting significant mistakes.

The process also lacks significant checks and balances. We don't know anything about how Ford's custodians are identified which are responsive. The extent of our knowledge is that counsel talked to the custodians before they were left on their own to decide what was relevant and then send over documents that they believe to be relevant over a six-year period. It's not a coherent or

legitimate way to collect ESI, and it's certainly not what plaintiffs did in this case.

Plaintiffs have been running ESI searches for all of their custodians. And to turn the argument on its head for a moment, if plaintiffs had not run search terms, we fully expect that Ford would be in front of Your Honor right now arguing vociferously that we have to use search terms. Because Ford didn't run these terms and doesn't know what its custodians did, it won't be able to answer questions about basic questions such as: Did the custodians retrieve all documents relating to EBS? To the patent? To the relevant source code programs? And doesn't know whether or not its custodians held documents back, either, because they wrongly thought that they were irrelevant or thought that the custodian, him or herself, would be in hot water for disclosing the documents.

Just two closing words briefly, Your Honor, about proof and burden. This is not a case where we're speculating that there are undisclosed documents that are out there as a result of the failure to run search terms. We know that Ford's custodians didn't produce relevant documents, not only because of technical holes in the production, which we'll get to later, but because Ford has produced incomplete documents and a chain showing that Ford's inventors or Ford's employees have been talking for

years about EBS IP.

And on that point, just looking to the submission we sent yesterday, including the redacted documents and the replacement document after Ford clawed back these documents, that there are documents in their submission yesterday admitting that there were discussions in '14 and '15 at Ford about EBS' patents. That's Exhibit A to our letter of yesterday.

And then Ford's EBS 156809, Exhibit B to our submission yesterday in which, and I'm quoting the document, it said that Ford was "investigating existing IP in relation to its PFDI technology." And the IP reference in parentheses after that is EBS.

The reality is that these documents are likely just the tip of the iceberg, and that Ford's refusal to run terms is likely going to conceal not only the key technical documents, the documents that relate directly to plaintiffs, to Ford's willful infringement of plaintiffs' patents.

Finally, Your Honor, on the burden point, we do not think there's any real burden here to Ford running straightforward with ESI terms for its employees. We have done it for our own custodians. And if Ford says their employees are doing a good job, it will simply be the case that no or few new documents come up.

However, if it's as we suspect that it's not the

case, that means that there are significant responsive documents that plaintiffs are entitled to in this litigation.

THE COURT: What I'm hearing from plaintiffs is things that Ford did not do in collecting responsive ESI documents. What is really a gaping absence from this discussion is what Ford did do that supports the argument by plaintiffs that there are gaps or an incompleteness in the production.

Plaintiffs have not steered the Court to anything in the production of documents, perhaps at the end when you mentioned briefly Exhibits A and B to yesterday's submission. But in the moving submission, completely absent is any case authority supporting a methodology that Ford should be obligated to follow when doing the search.

Certainly, every case is different. The volume of ESI at issue in every case is different. Some more voluminous and thus more challenging than in other cases.

And I'm looking at Page 3 of Ford's submission in opposition to the plaintiffs' motion, Document Item

Number 57, where Ford begins in this section to state on

Page 3 that Ford employed the following collection protocol for custodians, and goes on to list in several paragraphs, continuing throughout Page 4 of its submissions, of how it employed a methodology that was reasonably calculated to

secure completeness of production for the eight custodians that were not searching by search terms.

And you haven't addressed in any respect that methodology and why it's deficient, and you haven't addressed in any respect the cases which Ford cites at Page 4 which seem to support that it was an appropriate methodology to use. So you may have a moment to address those points, but I'll tell you, you haven't persuaded the Court on this point as of right now.

MR. O'CONNELL: Thank you, Your Honor. To address a couple of those points, I'll start with Ford's methodology addressed on Page 3 under the heading Ford's Document Collection Efforts.

In terms of the methodology, it doesn't resolve the concerns that we've raised today because our concerns relate principally to the concern about search terms mainly. The methodology that Ford provided explains that during the interviews, Ford and outside counsel concede the location and nature of relevant documents that Ford employees had, but it doesn't address in any way the concern that Ford employees may not have disclosed and allowed the collection of all the documents that were relevant.

For example, if the document were to hit on the term EBS, or were to hit on a patent number, or were to hit on one of the named specific classes of technical documents

that we've asked for, there's no certainty on this location-based methodology that that document was reviewed, collected, or even considered by the custodian in the first place.

So that is our concern, Your Honor. And to the extent that Your Honor's persuaded that, as a general matter, it is permissible to do this, we agree that that can be appropriate in certain cases. The problem here is that there is certainly no showing by Ford that it's conducted an adequate search with respect to finding specific classes of documents, not only related to the technical materials, but also narrow terms that could be run to disclose information about the patents, about communications, about this technology, and so on.

THE COURT: Again, you know, you're speaking very broadly and supposing that there is a level of incompleteness to this. You said the problem is it doesn't address specific classes of documents. I don't know what "specific classes of documents" refers to.

Can you please explain?

MR. O'CONNELL: Certainly, Your Honor. If you turn first to Exhibit 1 to defendant's responsive submission.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. O'CONNELL: This is the exhibit that they

rely on to explain that they think that they have produced the relevant technical documents that pertain to the accused products. And for example, if you look to Page 1 of that, you see that we ask for knock propensity studies, pre-emission studies, knock sensor location tests, and so on.

And next to that Ford cites a number of documents that are not those studies themselves. Even the parenthetical that Ford cites indicates that they're not the study, but are documents referencing those specific types of tests.

That is an example from a technical perspective of search terms could be used certainly to identify those tests which we still do not have. And then again, from the willfulness perspective, we understand from the documents that we have reviewed so far that there are likely other communications that these employees have pertaining to the patents or pertaining to EBS.

And we understand from counsel as well that they believe that their initial collection was of such a nature that we think that we have most of the relevant documents that Ford at least thinks are relevant pertaining to these custodians. And that's what leads us to believe that there are clearly responsive documents, including relating to the willfulness inquiry and the infringement of plaintiffs'

patents that have not been produced to date.

THE COURT: All right. Let me have Ford address that then.

MR. LIGOTTI: Thank you, Your Honor. This is Andrew Ligotti from Alston & Bird.

At the outset, I think Your Honor identified the issue squarely. The default standard for Delaware's discovery rules doesn't require the use of any particular methodology, let alone search terms. In fact, it accommodates the idea that search terms may not be used.

And in the present case, Ford went through a robust, guided, and detailed process that it regularly uses in large-scale litigations. And it did so over a period of a couple months, and it did so thoroughly.

Unlike what plaintiffs continue to misrepresent, this was not done where the custodians were allowed to go off and do their own thing. It was supervised. It was guided, and it was done specifically with the goal of counsel providing guidance on the relevant issues in the case. This isn't a situation where engineers were left to decide what was at issue in the case and what wasn't as plaintiffs misrepresent. This methodology has been deemed acceptable.

It also is telling that plaintiffs cannot point, as Your Honor noted, to any instance where something is

missing. For instance, they point to Exhibit A which was part of Ford's claw-back production, and they say that the document demonstrates that there were many discussions back in '14 and '15 on this topic. Yet, it's clear from the face of this document itself that that is in reference to the Auto News article that is earlier in the chain, which if plaintiffs reviewed that article, outlines all of the discussions that are identified in the complaint.

So thus, this document represents some sort of realm of other documents involving discussions is just not clear from the face of the document itself. Instead, citing to that Exhibit A is to try and cover up that at the end of the day, this is mere speculation. Counsel for plaintiffs has simply said that they think that there are other discussions, and that they would expect to see communications regarding EBS or other issues amongst Ford's custodians.

But that is not what is necessary to require

Ford to undo months of work that was done from a very guided

and robust perspective to generate the large volumes of

documents that were produced. And it also bears noting that

the custodial productions that Ford has produced to date are

not a circumstance where they are minimal. I mean, we are

talking about thousands of documents from some custodians.

And as Exhibit 1 to our letter demonstrates, a

non-exhaustive list of just how detailed these documents are about the technical issues with respect to the accused instrumentalities.

And I would also note that the reason that Ford uses this sort of collection process is because Ford is a very large company, and the custodians themselves are very aware as to how these documents are kept in their day-to-day businesses, where to get them, and how to retrieve them, which is why the first step that Ford takes is to identify all the potential custodians that are involved in the design and the development of these particular engines, have conversations with them to identify the location of where the information is allowing counsel to monitor and watch that process.

And it follows that this process of gathering documents from a number of different locations, including the custodial email inboxes, but also other locations from across Ford, collecting documents in that manner makes sense because running search terms on each and every location identified by a custodian, it would be overly burdensome. And it's for that reason that we leverage the knowledge of the custodians to identify the proper locations to search and collect documents. And that's exactly what we did.

There's been no showing of any deficiencies in the sense that there are documents that were withheld or

weren't identified. When plaintiffs' counsel says that there may be some documents that may be detrimental to a custodian and withheld, that's the quintessential example of speculation.

And finally, we've told plaintiffs that to the extent that they identify specific documents, and they do identify some specific documents in their submission for the first time using Mr. Richard Davis' declaration, we'll endeavor to go back, and to look, and to make sure that we can identify those documents and produce them. And so to say that there are a handful of documents that they've identified and that somehow represents that the entire search methodology that Ford employed from the outside of the case is improper, it's to tie two things together in a way that would lead to a burdensome and detrimental result for Ford to have to go back to the very beginning and start this process all over again.

THE COURT: All right. A few things --

MS. CLAYTON: Your Honor, this is Natalie Clayton for Ford. If I can make one other point.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. CLAYTON: In my experience, there's also no guarantee that using search terms gets you all of the relevant documents. Routinely in cases when search terms are used, after reviewing a party's production, you notice

that there are some documents that are missing, and you go back and ask the other side for those documents.

Plaintiffs have done that now with their other methodology that we used, and we're endeavoring to look to see if the documents they've now requested exist. But simply to paint with a broad brush and say what we did is improper and that only search terms can be used, I don't believe that's supported by the facts or the case law in this instance, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I have a question for Mr. Ligotti before I hear back from plaintiffs. Mr. Ligotti and/or Ms. Clayton, whoever is in the best position to answer it.

In reviewing the briefing for this discovery dispute, I came up with my checklist of things that were mentioned specifically which I'm going to tick off for the parties or for the defendant, Ford, right now. And I don't presume that this is an exhaustive list, it's just what I picked up on when I read the briefing.

And what I'd like to know is: Has Ford produced already or is it making an effort to supplement its production and look specifically for these specific items on the checklist that I constructed from reading the briefs that I believe plaintiffs are still interested in making sure they have?

The first is what came up in our last discovery dispute hearing. It was tests and studies which include, but may not be limited to, but certainly include knock intensity studies, pre-ignition studies, knock sensor location tests, direct injection fuel injector deposit tests, dyno test plans for the accused engines, release notes for Ford's fuel-system-related software, VST files, a file listing of Ford's PFDI member share point group folder, and National Highway Traffic Safety Administration reports, and testing docs.

Not all of those may have come up at the last hearing, but certainly the first one that I mentioned starting with knock intensity studies did. So what is the status of looking specifically for those items, Mr. Ligotti?

MR. LIGOTTI: Yes, Your Honor. At the outset, with respect to the categories of documents that Your Honor mentioned, Ford's production is filled with many instances of those documents or documents that have the content of those studies and tests. And we've identified but a few examples of situations like that.

For instance, Exhibits 1.1 and 1.2 as well as 1.3 include the injector deposit test that plaintiffs request. Other examples of Ford's production, including those documents requested, are the testing update emails that indicate the tests that were run and the results of

those tests. And there's a lot of other examples within

Ford's production for the documents that support Ford having

produced those requested documents.

That said, the specific instances that have been raised by plaintiffs, we are going back to the client and working to make sure that anything that was specifically identified that wouldn't have been -- isn't enforced production already, will be collected and produced as well, and we're in the process of doing that.

THE COURT: Can you give me a timeline reasonable estimate as to when that can be concluded so that plaintiffs have some sense of an expectation of when they might have that information?

MR. LIGOTTI: It probably could be completed in two to three weeks, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Anything further before

I hear any brief rebuttal from plaintiffs?

All right. Hearing none, I'll hear from Mr. O'Connell again.

MR. O'CONNELL: Thank you, Your Honor. A couple brief points responsive to those raised by Mr. Ligotti.

In response to our inquiries, we still haven't received an explanation of how Ford's custodians themselves as opposed to how Ford's counsel searched for documents.

What the responsive submission states is that Ford's counsel

was monitoring the location the custodians identified, but it doesn't explain how the custodians themselves identified what was responsive or how Ford checked that those custodians weren't holding anything back.

If there's some means that Ford's aware of presently about how or why it knows that its custodians weren't withholding relevant documents or emails, we think Ford is capable of answering that question today.

As a cross check, we do think that search terms would be extremely helpful. If we received similar numbers, the amount of documents that have been produced in this case, that would be a good indication perhaps that the methodology works with respect to some types of documents.

And if it's not, it will show that it isn't.

Even more narrowly, with respect to limited search terms for something as simple as EBS or the patents, plaintiffs' position is that we don't understand why that's not used as a cross check. That is a very limited search that would be extremely simple to run, particularly against a simple database like the employees' emails databases. It would pose no burden to Ford.

And finally, I just note in closing, Your Honor, that we have asked Ford for a deposition to test the representations about how it conducted custodial searches.

And to the extent that we'd ask that, we would also request

that Your Honor allow us to proceed very quickly with a 30(b)(6) deposition to test the representation that it's put forth in its letters and to the Court today.

THE COURT: All right. Let me hear from Ford.

I wasn't aware that there was any resistance to doing that.

Perhaps I overlooked something in the briefing, and I apologize if I did.

Mr. Ligotti.

MR. LIGOTTI: Yes, Your Honor. With respect to the issue of the depositions, there is no resistance to that. We're in the process of working out with plaintiffs that which they have requested.

One issue or one point that Mr. O'Connell raised is that from plaintiffs' view search terms would be helpful to confirm whether or not their suspicions and mere speculations that there are additional documents out there that weren't already collected is true or not. And putting aside the fact that it is, indeed, speculation that fuels that, it would result in an additional burden.

And as I noted earlier, in addition to the custodial email sources that are indicated here, Ford has dozens, if not more than dozens, locations of where it holds documents for all its different engine programs that changes over time. It's not simply the case where there's one batch of data that exists currently where a search term can be run

immediately, and we can verify plaintiffs' suspicion.

It would, indeed, be a burdensome effort to go back and undo months of work to identify the relevant locations, compile the raw data, and run search terms just to verify what EBS and MIT suspect may or may not be the case.

And I think that at the end of the day, it really is telling that there has been no showing that anything that Ford did is problematic in the sense that it was a thorough and extensive effort that it went through to identify the custodians, identify the locations, and work together with the custodians to collect the documents, other than mere speculation that they would expect to see additional documents for the other -- other documents should have been produced without any specifics.

And so I think that asking Ford to go back and redo this effort based on that is just simply not warranted in this case.

THE COURT: All right. I'm going to -- go ahead.

MR. O'CONNELL: I'm sorry. Your Honor, on the deposition issue, I just want to point out that we made this request on August 28th. And so we respectfully request that we begin the deposition date within the next two weeks with respect to testing the manner in which Ford conducted its

custodial searches.

THE COURT: All right. I'm prepared to make a bench ruling on this transcript with respect to this particular issue. And I will grant in part and deny in part the request that has been made by plaintiffs.

The part I will grant is that with respect to the specific categories of documents that I listed on this record based upon my review of the parties' submissions and based upon Mr. Ligotti's representation that he believes that that production can be supplemented if needed within the next two to three weeks, I will order that production of those specific categories of documents be made within two weeks. And that if for some reason it cannot be done within that time frame and more time is required, that Mr. Ligotti so notify plaintiffs' counsel, and the parties meet and confer on that. If there's an issue about how much additional time might be needed, then you can come back to the Court with that.

In the same vein, within the next two weeks,

Ford is to provide dates for the depositions of the

custodians that have been requested by the plaintiffs to

determine the level of completeness of the document search.

With respect to the balance of the request made by the plaintiffs, which again, I find too general really to be able to address, and as I said earlier, I find are more

framed in the negative. That is, what Ford has failed to do as opposed to what it has done to accomplish its responsibilities with respect to core technical document production. That part of the request is denied without prejudice.

First of all, if I'm going to address this issue, I want to be certain that the plaintiffs have thoroughly reviewed the production to date and are in an informed position to meaningfully present to the Court what deficiencies exist. I'm concerned that there hasn't been the development of a record of deficiencies, at least on the record before the Court at present.

The defendant is correct that the default discovery standard at 5b begins with the phrase, If the producing party elects to use search terms to locate potentially responsive ESI, then it goes on to explain what the obligations are. So it is an election on the part of the producing party.

And as I said, every case stands alone on its facts. I'm not saying on this record that what I feel appropriate to decide in this case is going to be useful for any other cases down the line. But given what I've heard and have no reason to disagree with from Ford, that is, that Ford followed a process it uses in large-scale litigations and supervised and guided that process throughout the course

of it. It identified all potential custodians at the design and development level of these particular engines, and counsel monitored that process, particularly in this instance where there may be multiple locations where relevant documents may be stored.

And counsel worked with the custodians to ferret out those locations and to select the documents necessary for production to satisfy its obligation to produce core technical documents. So I don't see any concrete showing of deficiencies on this record.

And furthermore, in reviewing some of the case authorities that Ford presented to the Court in its opposition papers, there are a number of cases which approve of searches in this fashion. One that I'll note for the record is Mirmina vs. Genpact. It's 2017 Westlaw 3189027. It's from the District of Connecticut, decided July 27, 2017.

And that seems to have involved the collection procedure analogous to those taken here by Ford which was found to be sufficient. That is, the issuance of a litigation hold, instructions to the ESI custodians, and the nature of how Ford says it's monitored its custodians here, an explanation given about the importance of a thorough search of ESI custodians and guidance provided by counsel. And thereafter, outside counsel conducting a review for

processing and production.

So I mean, there are ways in which to go about this that are not necessarily irretrievably tied to use of search terms. There may be other cases in which use of search terms is a more efficient way to search, but I find that what Ford did, at least on the record that it made here in its opposition papers, is sufficient.

Now, should the plaintiffs bring forward from their review of the production anything that would demonstrate an incompleteness, or a gap, or missing pieces of an email chain or communications that are suggested to have occurred, but for which documents have not been produced, then the Court is certainly open to revisiting this discovery issue. But for now, I will leave my ruling at that, and I'll be prepared to move on to the next issue raised by the plaintiffs.

But before I state that, let me state what I typically state on this record that discovery rulings are governed by Rule 72(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This transcript will serve as the order of the Court. I will not be issuing a written memorandum order in connection with this dispute, and the parties are guided by the procedures and timing requirements of Rule 72(a) in terms of bringing objections to the attention of Judge Colm Connolly, the district judge assigned to the case.

So with that, let's move on to the next issue.

Mr. O'Connell.

MR. O'CONNELL: Yes, Your Honor. I think we can shorten this a little bit by just turning to the technical documents because I understand that you've just ordered Ford to supplement its production of technical materials within the next two weeks.

I just want to be clear and make sure that we're capturing all of the documents that have been requested on that point. And I just wanted to ask the Court and Mr. Ligotti whether this will include the classes of documents that we have specifically identified on Pages 2 to 3 of our September 12th letter, and the software guide, the calibration manuals that Mr. Davis identified in Paragraph 9 of his affidavit.

THE COURT: I'll ask Mr. Ligotti to address that. I tried to come up with a comprehensive listing from what I interpreted from plaintiffs' papers, and if I didn't capture it all, let me ask Mr. Ligotti if there's any reason for the documents that have been identified just now by Mr. O'Connell that they wouldn't be wrapped into the search.

MR. LIGOTTI: Yes, Your Honor. Well, at the outset, the documents referenced on Pages 2 to 3 of plaintiffs' September 12th submission and some of the documents referred to in Exhibit C, Mr. Davis' declaration,

the documents that they're referring to are not specific.

They encompass the genus of documents that absolutely have been produced in this case.

For instance, the calibration guide for fuel monitoring of the PFDI system was produced in this case. Documents, schematics, other technical documents that indicate how the systems are controlled by the PFDIM and F\_HLD software programs, those have been produced in this case. Release notes for the fuel-system-related software have been produced in this case.

Now, with respect to some of those bulleted entries such as dyno test plans, release notes, our Exhibit 1 indicates many instances of some of those documents having been produced. What plaintiffs are requesting is all for each of those categories. So all dyno test plans, all release notes. That we would say is an overly burdensome search when phrased that way, but we will endeavor to go back with our client and have a conversation with them about the documents that they refer to in their letter and make sure that those documents either have been produced or will be produced.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. O'CONNELL: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. O'Connell.

MR. O'CONNELL: Just the two points that I think

were not mentioned, just to be clear, that in our letter we also requested the documents that Ford has pertaining to governmental reports or testing of the accused products, including the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration report and documents related to that.

THE COURT: Mr. O'Connell, I went down that list, and they were on my list. So I'm getting lost here in the weeds as to the disconnect between what I mentioned when I ticked off that list and what you're bringing up now.

And I don't think it's the appropriate time to split hairs over these things. I think, as I said earlier, I would like to see plaintiffs go through what Ford has done, what Ford has produced, and then make a record for me if there are deficiencies perceived by the plaintiffs that show me why plaintiffs believe there are deficiencies here. And if they relate to any of these categories that you're bringing up, then we'll deal with them at another time after this supplementation is made within two weeks.

And I would further add that if you're going to revisit this with the Court, make a stronger record, and also it would be helpful to have a proposed form of order that specifically identifies what documents you would like the Court to order production of so that I have a clearer roadmap rather than these more generalized comments about things not being produced. Because I'm hearing from

plaintiffs, this category of documents hasn't been produced.

And I'm hearing from Ford, yes, it has. Look at our

Exhibit 1 to the response.

And you know, nobody's helping me out here to do the comparison. So I think that comparison needs to be done, and shown to the Court, and a more clearer record made with a more specific form of order proposed so that I can address any deficiencies that are argued in the future.

MR. O'CONNELL: Thank you, Your Honor. We're happy to move on to the other issues in the letter.

THE COURT: All right. Very good.

MR. O'CONNELL: Your Honor, moving on to the copy with pride issue, this is the request made in our letter that Ford provide the documents relating to its copy with pride program, as well as documents from Mr. Hau Thai-Tang who Ford is not providing to plaintiffs as a custodian.

From our perspective, Your Honor, this is fairly straightforward. All we're requesting is, one, that Ford run this search term copy with pride for its existing custodians and produce the resulting documents.

And two, to run very limited terms against

Mr. Hau Thai-Tang's documents for copy with pride and

documents that relate to EBS or the patents. In terms of

the burden, there is minimal burden to doing this. It is

one term and a narrow set of documents against a single custodian.

And our concern here is that the reason that

Ford is pushing back against this term is that the notion

that this term will, in fact, pull up responsive documents

and will support plaintiffs' willful infringement case. And

this is not a situation where we're guessing in the dark as

to whether or not these documents exist. We know that Ford

has these documents.

We included as Exhibit J to our letter a copy of the presentation that Mr. Hau Thai-Tang has given Ford's engineers about the copy with pride program. And on that point, Ford's contention that it shouldn't run a term, a single term for documents that we know exist and that we know are responsive, we don't find plausible.

With regard to Mr. Hau Thai-Tang, just to distinguish from the argument that Ford is making, we are not asking yet at this time that Mr. Thai-Tang's deposition be offered. We're just asking for a limited set of searches for responsive material on Mr. Thai-Tang's documents.

The case that Ford cited, the Galmines vs.

Novartis, a False Claims Act case is about the Apex

Doctrine, and that's a doctrine that, even that decision acknowledges, is limited to this context of compelling a deposition of an executive. And indeed, in that case, a

non-party executive.

That's not what we're trying to do here. All we're asking for is the limited set of documents pertaining to -- one search term pertaining to a series of custodians, and a limited set of documents from one custodian. And in the Galmines case, it was a foregone conclusion that the plaintiffs already had the documents of the custodian that they had asked for.

In terms of the application of the Apex Doctrine in Delaware, we'd cite the Court instead to the Intel Corp. case. That's 2008 Westlaw 5377979 District of Delaware, December 18, 2008. And that's a case in which Judge Farnan adopted special master's order concluding that even non-party depositions of certain executives with important testimony could be compelled.

And again, we cite that to Your Honor acknowledging the question presented here that, even reaching the level of deposition for Mr. Hau Thai-Tang, we're merely requesting a limited set of documents from a custodian with whom we understand that Ford has not yet collected documents.

THE COURT: All right. I have a couple of questions. Again, turning to Page 2 of Ford's submission, in the first instance, they say that this article from which this copy with pride assertion of a program comes from the

plaintiffs, they say that that article has nothing to do with the case.

In any event, they say that Mr. Thai-Tang's records should not be searched, not just based upon the Apex Doctrine, but because he stepped into the role in June of 2017, largely after the accused engines were developed, and was not involved in the day-to-day work of the design of the engines, and that there are other custodians at Ford whose records have been searched that are more relevant to the issues pending in this case.

Can you address each of those?

MR. O'CONNELL: Certainly, Your Honor. And just to divide it into two pieces, I just want to be clear to distinguish the issue of the copy with pride term being run against the existing custodian where we think that there really is no additional burden given these custodians have already been consulted by Ford, and it's a single term, and the question of whether the Court would order a production and collection of such documents from Mr. Thai-Tang.

With respect to the Court's question about the relationship between the copy with pride program in this case, there are two reasons that it's connected. First, it is explicitly connected online in the public reporting on this piece that Ford has engaged in a practice of copying competitors' technology in the past and specifically

mentions this litigation.

But more broadly in these cases, the question of subjective recklessness and subjective knowledge with regard to infringement is something that the jury is free to decide in this case. I direct the Court to the Georgetown Rail Equipment Company Case vs. Hollins. That's 867 F. 3d 1229, 1245, Federal Circuit 2017. That the jury is free to decide whose evidence it finds more compelling on the question of willfulness, including on this question of subjective recklessness.

And this copy with pride program is evidence that we will use going on in this case as evidence of Ford's recklessness with regard to the manner in which competitors' technology is copied, if not actual direct knowledge of the fact that it has copied competitors' technology. And on that point, we think it's a key to that inquiry. And given the fact that there are public documents already connecting that program to this case, we think it is proper and will impose minimal burden to collect those documents from the existing custodian.

With regard to Mr. Thai-Tang, again acknowledging Ford's arguments about cases that are premised on deposition, and he stepped into the role recently, I understand the point that he has stepped into the role recently. But since that time, he has given a presentation

that has been publicly revealed about the Ford copy with pride program, and that is our basis for requesting additional documents from him. In addition to the fact that in our complaint and from the beginning of this action, we have quoted statements that Mr. Thai-Tang has made about the accused products.

THE COURT: All right. I'll hear from Ford.

MR. LIGOTTI: Thank you, Your Honor. Andrew Ligotti from Alston & Bird. First and foremost, I think all of plaintiffs' arguments are met by or predicated on a misrepresentation of a single article somehow evidencing a persuasive program that's existed within Ford for years.

It's nothing of the sort. It's an Automotive
News article that was published just recently, and it does
mention in this litigation. Yes. But it is about another
litigation, the Versata Litigation, and it's unrelated
entirely.

And it has a single image in it that refers to a power-point that Mr. Hau Thai-Tang gave in 2018. And it just bears noting that, as you can see from that image in Exhibit J, it says benchmark and copy with pride. And without getting into the weeds of the automotive technology world, benchmarking is a common industry standard practice where an engine is taken, and tested, and the data that comes from that testing is known as the benchmarking of that

engine.

It's very common across the industry. In fact, the benchmarking of the Toyota V6 engines in the mid-2000's demonstrates quite clearly the PFDI technology that plaintiffs claim to have invented in the patents-in-suit which existed long before then.

So this is something where they've taken an image in an article that's irrelevant and drawn these massive conclusions about what it represents. And in due correspondence with Ford, plaintiffs have referred to it as the copy with pride program training. They refer to it as a copy with pride slogan. They've referred to it as a policy.

It's all derived from this single image in an Automotive News article. Nothing more, nothing less. And so to say that that is the hook to burden a senior executive at Ford, an executive vice president of product development and purchasing is to really stretch what that article is.

And I would note that we've mentioned the Apex Doctrine which is often utilized in the context of depositions, not because this is in the context of a deposition, but because it's a tool for guiding the Court's analysis in whether to limit discovery under Rule 26(b)(2)(c) which is not limited to only depositions.

And the Court must limit the frequency or extensive discovery otherwise allowed by these rules or by

local rule if it determines that the discovery is unreasonably cumulative, or duplicative, or otherwise outside the scope, or obtained from another source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive. We pointed to these cases as representation that Mr. Thai-Tang is a senior executive with no direct relevance to any of the issues that are actually in this case.

Plaintiffs cite to, I think, one public statement where he's referring to the Ford F150 and its new V6 technology. That a senior executive at Ford would make a single public statement or even a couple public statements about one of Ford's most successfully selling vehicles is not a sufficient nexus to tie a single image from an Automotive News article and establish a persuasive program that would warrant Ford's going and obtaining documents from Mr. Thai-Tang, searching for them, and producing them in this case.

He has no relevance to the issues of this case. And in his role as executive vice president of product development and purchasing, he has people that are junior to him, some of which have been identified as Ford's custodians in this case, and we have collected and produced thousands of documents that get into the specifics of how the engines were designed and developed.

And so we cite to the cases on the Apex Doctrine

to point out that it provides an analysis for the Court to use in deciding whether to utilize its power under Rule 26(b)(2)(c) as emblematic of the fact that it should utilize that power here. And I would also note that one of the considerations in whether the Apex Doctrine should be wielded is whether or not the person who -- the Apex witness who has been identified has any specific, personal, unique non-duplicative knowledge.

And there is a nexus requirement that that specific and personal knowledge has a relation to the issues in the case. And that's why I point out, Your Honor, that the plaintiffs' nexus here is tenuous at best. In fact, tenuous is definitely too strong of a word. They've identified a single Automotive News article that has a single image in it, and they've tried to connect that to the technology that Ford has been developing since at least 2012, 2013, long before Mr. Thai-Tang stepped into his role as executive vice president, long before Mr. Thai-Tang had a single slide that said benchmark and copy with pride, which again, as I pointed out, refers back to the industry standard of benchmarking, and certainly long before the plaintiffs brought this case.

And so I think here it's fair to keep in mind the context that plaintiffs have asked Ford to take its additional custodians and add yet another one that has no

relation to the case. And it seems that the record is extremely thin here for supporting that request.

THE COURT: All right. Response, Mr. O'Connell.

MR. BERRY: Yes, Your Honor. I think Ford is conflating two issues here, and they're two separate questions that are raised by our request.

The first which Ford began with is the request for documents from Mr. Thai-Tang as an additional custodian. But more fundamentally, our request is for documents about the copy with pride program.

And what Mr. Ligotti acknowledged in his argument is, regardless of whether or not what

Mr. Thai-Tang's possession of its program and giving of this presentation, he has people junior to him who would also have, one would assume, copies of this presentation. And in Mr. Ligotti's argument, he made a number of points stating that Ford has no copy with pride program, that Ford has no copy with pride program, that Ford has no copy with pride slogan, it has no trainings, and so on. If that's the case, having the existing custodians from whom Ford has already collected documents, that running against their original document set a single term, copy with pride will determine whether or not that representation is true.

If there are no such documents, if there's no burden, there will be no documents to produce. But if there are documents, they are documents that are going to be

relevant to whether or not Ford does, in fact, have a slogan, a training, a presentation, a mantra of teaching engineers to copy the intellectual property of others.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. LIGOTTI: Your Honor, if I could just reply briefly to Mr. O'Connell's points?

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. LIGOTTI: With respect to the issue of whether additional searches should be run on Ford's present custodians, this is, once again, a circumstance where plaintiffs use mere speculation to sort of tie together a request to add additional terms. But it also bears noting that, as we just discussed with Ford's document collection process, Ford does not have the custodial data isolated in the sense where it can easily run search terms. That's not the methodology that was utilized for the majority of Ford's custodians.

And so there is a burden here, and it's not -plaintiffs just presume that there is no burden because it's
one term, but these custodians would have to have their data
imaged and isolated in order to allow Ford to be in a
position to run that term. And doing that, based merely on
the speculation that comes solely from this one article in
the Automotive News website, is not warranted in this case.

THE COURT: All right. Having heard the

arguments of counsel and read the briefs, I'm prepared to issue a ruling on this issue. And I am going to grant it in part and deny it in part.

The part that I will deny will be to add

Mr. Thai-Tang as a custodian. That is presently denied
without prejudice.

The part I will grant is to add the copy with pride search term to be run against the existing custodians and existing document sets. I think that the plaintiff has sufficiently established in this article the significance of running that search term.

The parties dispute the significance of this article. The parties dispute the interpretation or how the Court should interpret this article, yet the Court finds that there are enough references to issues and this specific litigation which make the copy with pride search term relevant.

As to burden, that argument hasn't really been developed, except on this record. So if at a future time, after conducting this search for the additional term copy with pride, Ford wishes to make an application for the plaintiffs to bear some portion of the cost of that, you're free to do so. I'm not saying that the Court would grant it, but I have no way of assessing the burden, the expense, the time commitment of doing that other than what I've heard

on this call that records need to be imaged, and isolated, and searched. And you know, there's no limitations on that, or concrete costs, or time commitments associated with that that have been mentioned on this record that would allow the Court to assess just how burdensome it is.

But I think, as I said, based upon the article which has been submitted by plaintiffs, there is a sufficient basis to go forward with adding that search term. So that is my ruling with respect to that issue.

What further issues remain for the plaintiffs, Mr. O'Connell? It's my understanding that --

MS. CLAYTON: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MS. CLAYTON: -- this is Natalie Clayton. Can I please ask for some clarification on that ruling just to make sure we understand what the Court is ordering?

So, obviously, we have the two custodians with whom we used search terms, and we understand the Court is ordering us to use the search terms on their documents that we have collected. For those custodians for whom we did not use search terms, and there is not an isolated set of -- there's data, right, that would have -- full searches could be easily run.

Is the Court ordering us to run searches on those custodians, nonetheless, or are we to employ the same

type of searches we previously conducted with those custodians in looking for documents that would relate to the article or anything related to copy with pride?

THE COURT: For those eight custodians that you haven't used search terms, you are to go back to those custodians with the relevant portions of this transcript and direct them that this Court has ordered them to produce records that relate to the copy with pride program and have those records searched and produced, if any exist.

MS. CLAYTON: Understood. Thank you for the clarification, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Next issue,

Mr. O'Connell, I think I read that -- and plaintiffs may

dispute this, but I read in defendant's submission that the

issue of source code is moot at least for the moment.

Do plaintiffs agree?

MR. O'CONNELL: Your Honor, one caveat on it. I suppose two caveats.

The first is that Ford has not given us a specific date by which it will produce the source code. And just mindful of the Court's admonition last time that Ford would have to act quickly once it was determined that this source code was relevant based on the evidentiary record, we request that the Court order Ford to make the code available as we recommended September 25th in our letter.

And then the second point was that we'd request that a manifest of all code for the fuel management system of the accused products be provided. Ford is already required under the terms of the Protective Order to give us a manifest of the source code that they're producing which we understand, and Ford can correct us, is the PFDIM and F\_HLD code, but Ford is not agreeing to provide a manifest with regard to other programs that may interact with it or that may be necessary to understand the code.

And so we'd respectfully request that the Court simply ask Ford to provide a manifest of the fuel management system code which is simply a list of the files that the parties can use to determine whether or not there's other relevant code that may be necessary.

THE COURT: Mr. Ligotti, can you address that?

MR. LIGOTTI: Yes, Your Honor. First, with

respect to the requested date that plaintiffs provide of

September 25th, we'll note that we made the determination

that we were unable to make the review of the source code

available on Friday. We have not yet had an opportunity to

have a discussion with plaintiffs and meet and confer about

a number of issues related to making that available.

The Protective Order has a number of protocols that I think we need to circle up with plaintiffs on and answer before we can give a date certain. And we were

hoping to have that conversation with plaintiffs following this call or tomorrow and get that process started.

In a similar sense, Mr. O'Connell notes that they've requested a manifest for the fuel management system in particular. Our understanding was that they have been requesting a manifest for the entirety of Ford's ECU and software installed in the vehicles, and so we had objected to that thinking that it was overly broad.

If instead it's a different request that it's a manifest for the fuel management system, we can meet and confer when we're determining the particulars of the Protective Order's protocol and see if we can reach agreement on that point, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Anything further, Mr. O'Connell?

MR. O'CONNELL: Yes, Your Honor. On the manifest issue, we're not trying to narrow our request. To the extent that Ford is understanding that we're asking for less, I don't think we are.

The manifest is a fairly straightforward low-burden document to produce. It's just a list of the folder structure that contains the ECU code. And so to the extent that the fuel management system code is less than what's contained in the ECU, we would ask for a manifest of the code that is contained in the ECU.

And second, with regard to the production date, this has been an issue for many months. The Court heard this dispute about whether or not Ford has to produce source code for the first time many months ago. I believe in June. Plaintiffs' concern is just that if Ford leaves this hearing today without a firm date by which it's going to produce the code, this will simply drag on for many weeks as this has. And mindful of the fact that Judge Connolly has requested that this action be kept on schedule and the parties work towards moving along in the accelerated timeline, we request that the Court provide a date by which Ford must produce the code so that we do not need to raise this issue a third time.

MR. LIGOTTI: Your Honor, if I could briefly be heard on that last point?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. LIGOTTI: With respect to reaching agreement with plaintiffs and how that affects the date, there are concrete issues that are raised by the protocol that are unanswered. For instance, where specifically the laptop will be made available, costs associated with that laptop, programs, software programs that will installed in that laptop. And specifically with respect to the location, leases, or other sort of information, or other sort of accommodations to make the laptop available at a particular

location has to be sorted out.

And until we get an answer from plaintiffs that will stem from a conversation that we have not yet had with them, it's unclear as to exactly what the time frame is that is at issue here. That said, we would expect to move quickly on this, and we, you know, like I mentioned earlier, would like to have a conversation with plaintiffs shortly after this hearing to start to iron out some of those particulars.

THE COURT: All right. Well, here's what I'm going to do. I am going to impose a deadline of September 25th for production of the source code that Ford has indicated it would produce with respect to the two specific codes, the PFDIM and F\_HLD.

I understand that the parties need to meet and confer about the protocols for that to be accomplished, and I instruct the parties to do that immediately after this call is concluded today. And I leave it to the parties whether or not to adjust out that date, September 25th, by a few days in order to accommodate whatever protocols are agreed to by the parties, if needed.

And I'll instruct Ford to be prepared to produce the manifest of source code for the source code it's producing. I'm going to deny any requests that would require Ford to produce a manifest for these systems in the

entire vehicle trunk to hood, tires to roof. I can't see how that's proportional and relevant to the discrete engine-related issues that we're discussing with respect to this case, but I am no automotive engineer, so that is without prejudice.

And I think the portions of the manifest that would be most helpful to a meaningful review and understanding of the source code that will be produced, I think the parties are capable of discerning that. And if there's any issue over the scope of that, then certainly you can come back to the Court promptly prior to any source code review, if that's what it takes.

But just to make sure everyone's aware of where the Court stands, I'm not requiring a manifest of source code for systems in the vehicle in totality. I think the parties have to do their best to be proportional in this case. And I suppose that is asking the plaintiffs to make sure that they are being specific and proportional as to what they're looking for. I want the source code review to be a meaningful exercise, certainly for the plaintiffs, but I also want it to be proportional for the defendants.

With that, are there any other issues remaining?

By my checklist, I think we've covered all of plaintiffs'

issues. But if I'm missing anything, Mr. O'Connell, please

flag it.

1 MR. O'CONNELL: That's correct, Your Honor.

Those are the issues that we've raised in our briefs.

THE COURT: All right. I'm now ready to turn to Ford's issues. Just give me a moment to pull those briefs in front of me. I have Document Numbers 55, which is Ford's moving submission, and plaintiffs' response at 56. I now have those in front of me, and I'll turn it over to counsel for Ford who will take the lead on these arguments.

But I guess I want to start with just a cautionary preliminary statement that much of this seems like a do-over from our previous discussion, and I'm not a fan of do-overs. If there's new information that would be persuasive for the Court to change its positions on rulings related to these issues that I made previously, I'm open certainly to hearing it. But if this is just an effort to have a second bite or a do-over, I am not persuaded to change my views.

So with that in mind, I'll hear from Ford.

MS. CLAYTON: Thank you, Your Honor. This is
Natalie Clayton for Ford. We appreciate what Your Honor
just said, and there were two main issues that arose at the
last hearing that we thought would provide the Court with
the benefit of a more fulsome record.

The first was the case law with regard to priority. Plaintiffs had said that as sort of a matter of

right, they are automatically entitled to their priority date. And as a result, none of the documents that Ford was seeking post-2004 from the Bobcat project could possibly be relevant.

And you know, Your Honor, we believe that that was a misstatement of the law. And so our letter, in part, goes to demonstrating that the Federal Circuit has concluded on numerous occasions that priority is something that they are not entitled to as a matter of right, and that, indeed, it can and successfully is challenged quite often. And so our letter tried to provide the Court with some more context and case law from the Federal Circuit on that point.

The second issue that we tried to highlight that Ford has discovered, now that it has had more opportunity to look at the documents that Ford has in its possession, is that in addition to being relevant to the priority issue and when the inventions here were conceived up and reduced to practice, it became clear to us in looking at Ford's production and documents that, you know, we recently provided to plaintiffs that Ford, indeed, has an argument that it is a part or entire owner of this invention by virtue of certain license agreements between the parties, both in the memorandum of understanding and the agreement that the parties entered into as a result of the project and with the Department of Energy.

And looking at Ford's production, we started to see evidence of the fact that Ford is the one who came up with the inventions that are now claimed in the patents-in-suit as part of the Bobcat project. And we have attached some of those documents to our filing for the Court.

And the agreements say, at least our interpretation of the agreements say that if that is the case, then Ford is minimally a part owner with the royalty-free license or perhaps the entire owner of the rights to these patents. And so Your Honor had said that on a more fulsome record, she would take another look at the issue if we brought it to the Court's attention. And so with this more fulsome case law record and factual record, we wanted to bring the issue to the Court again.

The other thing that had become clear to us as we thought about the issues more is that from plaintiffs' response, it's clear that their entire defense to not wanting to produce these documents is that they believe that we have to prove our case at the outset with regard to priority and licensing rights in order for them to get discovery. And that simply isn't how litigation is conducted.

We are entitled to discovery in order to try to prove the theory that we have in the case. And it's the

real practicality of the fact that if the Court ultimately determines that they do not have priority to the 2004 application, if that is the case, then what will end up happening is that Ford will then be required to request that discovery be reopened in order to investigate and obtain discovery on its defense since it is the proper owner or co-owner of this technology as a result of the agreements and the development work that's attached to the Bobcat project.

And so, Your Honor, we do believe that we have a more fully developed record that we have presented in these papers and that the case law supports that these documents could go to the priority argument. And so we believe that the documents relate to conception and reduction to practice which is not subject to the Court's six-year rule.

And alternatively, that even if they don't relate to conception and reduction to practice, good cause exists given the further record that Ford has presented in these letters.

THE COURT: All right. I will hear from plaintiffs.

MR. HEALY: Thank you, Your Honor. This is

Andres Healy of Susman Godfrey. In considering and
rejecting Ford's same request only a few weeks ago, this

Court made two things abundantly clear.

Number one, it made clear that it was Ford's burden to show not just relevance, but good cause to Ford's plaintiffs to undertake to produce discovery from this period which started, you know, more than a decade ago, and it ran for a course of years.

And number two, the Court made very clear that it did not intend to casually set aside the six-year discovery limitation, but rather to justify the Court doing that, that Ford was going to have to come forward with convincing evidence to meet its burden. And quite simply, as this Court stated before, it hasn't done so.

I apologize. The sum and substance of Ford's argument is simply a repeat and a rehash of what it argued the last time.

Number one, Ford repeats its argument that the Bobcat document somehow will show that the plaintiffs' patents are not entitled to their 2004 priority date because they were confirmed -- and this is a direct quote, and I think the sum and substance of Ford's argument from Page 3, "that EBS and Ford jointly came up with the single fuel injection technology."

And we have always understood Ford's argument to be that somehow my client and the inventors did not conceive of using gasoline as a direct injection fuel source, and that's borne out by what Ford wrote in their letter. And as

we argued the last time and as this Court agreed, as a matter of law, that argument fails.

And why is that? Because as this Court pointed out at the last hearing, whether a patent is entitled to its priority date, it is determined by looking at the patent itself by "a comparison of the patents-in-suit to the original application." That's borne out by the Federal Circuit LizardTech decision stating that you look to either the claims or the specification of the original application.

It's borne out by the Akamai decision we cited which held that what a patent understands or intends the claims to mean is irrelevant to its objective meaning and scope. And it's not surprising that Ford did not cite a single case that looked to extrinsic evidence to determine whether a continuation patent -- and that's an important distinction because the bulk of the case law that Ford cites is detailed and relates to a continuation in part which, obviously, has a different additional material in its specification, and that's why this question arises.

But none of the patents or none of the cases that Ford cites even look to extrinsic evidence. In fact, to the contrary and contrary to Ford's characterization, the Vas-Cath decision that they cite specifically states, "The test for sufficiency of the Court in a parent application is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon

reasonably conveys the artisan that the inventor has possession at that time of the later claimed subject matter."

So again, if you look to the patent, if you look to the application, the specification and the claims, not extrinsic evidence. And in fact, in the Board of Trustees' decision that Ford cites in its brief, the Federal Circuit actually held that the board had erred in relying on portions of an expert's testimony that relied on certain extrinsic evidence.

So simply put, the Federal Circuit has held that extrinsic evidence like the Bobcat evidence is entirely legally irrelevant, the priority issue that Ford is relying on to, nevertheless, argue that good cause exists here.

And I do want to briefly respond. Ford has made a few points talking about the legal standards, and I think attempting to argue that we had misrepresented what those are. We disagree, absolutely. We've cited in our brief a decision out of the Eastern District of Texas that says, "Defendant must inevitably convince the Court by clear and convincing evidence that plaintiff is not entitled to the earlier filing date because the written description of the earlier application does not support the '678 patent claim."

Judge Andrews in the Endo decision that we cited in our brief reached the same result basically concluding or

expressly concluding that the defendants' argument that the patentee holding a continuation patent, again a distinction from a continuation in part, which is the case law that Ford cites, that it was simply incorrect for defendants to argue that there wasn't a presumption of priority, and that it wasn't their burden to disprove or break that chain.

And I think it's important here, even setting aside the fact that, as a matter of law, Ford's arguments as to why the Bobcat evidence is relevant simply just don't follow. The facts here are clear that the actual relevant evidence, the parent's application, which Ford has never disputed as an accurate copy. We submitted it as Exhibit B to our opposition letter. You know, even Ford now admits that it must, because the Court, you know, pointed it out at the last hearing, state specifically in the specification, expressly contemplates — this is November of 2004 — again, no dispute as to that date — years prior to the Bobcat project even being conceived — the 2004 application expressly states and contemplates "the use of direct injection of gasoline." That's at Page 5 of Exhibit B.

And to be very clear, that's not all it says.

The very next page which Ford never mentioned, or discusses, or discloses to the Court, but the very next page, it states again, "direct injection of gasoline results in approximately a five octane number decrease in the octane

number required by the engine." So the core point of Ford's motion which is repeated is that "this evidence" -- I apologize. That it may show "EBS and Ford jointly came up with the single fuel direct injection technology."

That's what Ford says is at issue. And the 2004 patent application, years prior to Bobcat even existing, irrefutably demonstrates that that's not the case. We even point out in the original claims of that application, again filed 2004, years prior to Bobcat, specifically, and directly, and expressly claim the use of gasoline as a direct injection fuel source.

So our point, frankly, as to this justification as to why these documents are relevant is that, number one, legally they're not. The Federal Circuit and this court made that clear.

And number two, it's further refuted by the fact, by the irrefutable demonstration that the original patent application which predates the Bobcat project by years, demonstrates that my clients had invented this technology and had conceived of this technology years before Bobcat was even considered. And that falls into Ford's second justification, this argument that somehow as a result of agreement and memorandum of understanding entered into years later that Ford somehow obtained rights to obtain my client's patents.

And again, Ford's own documents squarely refute that position. Both of the agreements expressly say that it's only, at a minimum, technology that is jointly developed to which Ford would obtain any rights. Again, the 2004 application demonstrates that my clients had the technology at issue years prior.

As I say, as a preliminary matter, Ford has never explained how agreements between EBS and Ford would give Ford rights to MIT's patent. But even setting that aside, again we have the irrefutable proof of the 2004 patent application.

And then even further than that, the 2006 end review, this is language that we quoted in our letter to this Court, but it makes very clear specifically that neither party would get any rights on any patents that "were based upon patent applications of one of the parties before the effective date in coming into legal force after the effective date." That's exactly our scenario.

And then it even goes further. It says that neither party would get rights of any patents that are "based on MIT patent applications before the effective date which are licensed by EBS and coming into legal force after the effective date." Again, it's exactly the scenario, and Ford offered no justification for how it can, nevertheless, obtain rights in our patents, Your Honor.

And with respect to Ford's third justification of estoppel argument, I didn't hear counsel reference that, and I'm happy to not address it, unless the Court has a preference. I'd simply state that Ford has presented no new evidence, no new case law, nothing other than, I think, conceding that it was reiterating its argument. And we believe that the Court has already resolved that argument and that its resolution should remain the same.

THE COURT: Before I hear from Ms. Clayton, I do have a question for you, Mr. Healy, if you're in a position to answer it. What have plaintiffs produced thus far in discovery related to whether the inventors conceived of the inventions in the patents or reduced them to practice? To what extent has there been document production on those issues?

MR. HEALY: Absolutely, Your Honor. So we have agreed to produce, and my understanding is we have produced. Mr. O'Connell can correct me if I'm wrong, but that we have produced certainly the file histories. We've produced any conception or reduction to practice documents, including anything predating the 2004 applications. For example, lab notebooks or information disclosure statements, to the extent that they exist, all have been collected and produced.

And we have told Ford that we will produce

identical documentation throughout the time period, so before 2004, frankly, to the extent that it exists for all of the patents at issue in the asserted patents.

I hope that answers your question.

THE COURT: Okay. It does.

I'll hear back from Ms. Clayton now.

MS. CLAYTON: Thank you, Your Honor. You know, plaintiffs' first argument was that the Federal Circuit has determined that extrinsic evidence can never be relevant to the priority analysis, and that none of the cases that we cite support anything other than that. And that's just, frankly, untrue.

If you look at the Nuvo Farms decision that we cited from the Federal Circuit and look at Pages 26 to 27 of the decision with the Lexus cite, the Federal Circuit actually pointed to testimony from the inventor about whether or not he was in possession of the invention at the time. And in fact, the Federal Circuit concluded, and I quote, "Although inventor testimony cannot establish written description support where none exists in the four corners of the specification, it illuminates the absence of critical description in this case."

And that's exactly what we believe that the Bobcat documents will do here, Your Honor. They will illuminate the fact that the invention that they set forth

in their 2004 application was very different from the invention that they ultimately claimed in 2011 with the patents that are at issue in this lawsuit.

And so it's simply incorrect that extrinsic evidence can never be relevant to the priority and written description analysis. In fact, the Federal Circuit, you know, has looked to such evidence in particular when determining that written description support is not available.

The next argument that plaintiffs presented was with regard to the burden of proof, but again, Your Honor, that's putting the cart before the horse. Whether or not we have the ultimate burden of proof when it comes to the ultimate issue of whether or not there is priority is irrelevant to the issue of whether or not we're entitled to discovery on that issue. That would be like saying, oh, we were never entitled to jurisdictional discovery simply because, you know, they say that jurisdiction is not proper in this case.

We are entitled to discovery on both the issue of the priority date and the issue of whether or not the Ford employees contributed to the invention that was filed in 2011 in order to try to prove and meet our burden of proof with regard to the legal issues in this case. And so putting the cart before the horse is not what the federal

rules contemplate or the case law contemplates in terms of how discovery is supposed to operate.

The third point is that, again, seeking to try to prove the ultimate issue at this stage of the case, we heard plaintiff talk about the specification that was filed back in 2004. And while I don't think, you know, this issue should be litigated in the discovery portion of the case, what I would like to point out is that plaintiffs very selectively quote from the specification. And what they fail to point out to the Court is that the first line on Page 5, it says, "It is also possible to use direct injection of gasoline as well as direct injection of ethanol." In other words, this contemplates directly injecting both of those things, ethanol plus gasoline.

Here, the inventions that they have tried to patent and have sued Ford on cover using just gasoline.

That's what they're claiming. So it's much broader and different than that disclosure on Page 5.

As for the next disclosure they point to, if you read that entire section, what it is doing is telling you that directly injecting gasoline does not give you the same benefit as directly injecting ethanol and is using the gasoline example to contrast and show how much better it is to directly inject ethanol.

And so while I think it's improper at this stage

to litigate whether or not they're entitled to priority, the evidence that plaintiffs point to falls short. And at a minimum, they show that we have very different views, both on the priority argument and who is correct, and also on the licensing argument and who is correct there.

And because there is a clear dispute between the parties as to who is correct on these issues, the parties should be entitled to fulsome discovery on these issues so they can ultimately prove their case.

And finally, the argument that the documents related to Bobcat can't relate to our licensing defense, again, it's predicated on the notion that they win on their 2004 priority date argument. If they don't ultimately win on that issue, those documents go squarely to who actually invented what was filed in 2011 and whether or not Ford has a right to those inventions.

And so at this stage, we believe the proper course is to allow that discovery, allow a fulsome record to be determined, and ultimately the Court or the jury will decide the issue, but Ford is entitled to discovery in order to make its case here, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. This issue was heard at the last hearing, and I have not found that the good cause standard has been met under Paragraph 4E of the default standard to go back beyond six years before filing the

complaint to require production of the Bobcat documents. So I'm denying the request.

And as I stated in the last hearing,

Paragraph 4E of the default standard provides that absent a showing of good cause, follow-up discovery shall be limited to a term of six years before the filing of the complaint, except that discovery related to asserted prior art or the conception and reduction to practice of the inventions claimed in any patent-in-suit shall not be so limited.

And let me just say a couple of things to clarify this record. I understand Ford's arguments with respect to a priority date challenge. And to the extent I indicated generally that priority date challenges are built around a written description inquiry, and that inquiry is based generally upon a comparison of the patents-in-suit and, in this instance, the 2004 application to which they claim priority.

But in no way should that comment be taken as a ruling as a matter of law. I am addressing discovery disputes, and I only look at the general law surrounding priority date challenges to guide me with respect as to whether or not to permit discovery of extrinsic evidence in this case. And I look at that under a standard of Rule 26 relevance and proportionality, and in the context of Rule 4e of our default standard which requires a showing of good

cause.

And I assess all of that, and I assess the record that's made and put before me allegedly to justify the good cause or to establish the good cause requirement has been satisfied. And I take that into consideration in making my rulings.

This is in no way to be interpreted that the plaintiffs have established a 2004 priority date as a matter of law or as a ruling that the Court as a matter of law should not consider extrinsic evidence when considering arguments about that priority date challenge or a ruling as a matter of law as to the proper construction of any agreements between EBS and Ford including not limited to the memorandum of understanding.

All of those issues are on the plate of the district judge. They're not my dispositive issues. I haven't been referred those dispositive issues. I've been referred discovery. I only look at the law to put things in context as to what I should consider relevant and proportional to the needs of the case.

And I'm just saying, that in this instance on this record and on the record made before me, I'm not satisfied that there's good cause to start requiring production of extrinsic evidence with respect to this Bobcat project. There may come a time where a deposition or some

other documentary discovery reveals that we should delve a little bit further into that and go beyond the limits set in the default standard, but I don't find that we're there yet.

So please be clear on the nature of my rulings.

Don't be arguing in future dispositive motions to Judge

Connolly that I've made any findings as a matter of law.

All I've done is tried to assess what discovery may be relevant and proportional to the needs of the case under Rule 26.

So obviously my ruling is without prejudice.

And similarly, I find nothing different on the record with respect to the estoppel arguments that would convince the Court to allow Ford to have discovery on estoppel beyond the six-year limit in the default standard based on what I've read in the papers. And Ford hasn't really pressed for that on the call today, although it did raise the issue again in its briefing.

So I will stand on these rulings. If Ford should find that there are deficiencies in the production of discovery with respect to conception and reduction to practice, Ford is free to bring those to the attention of the Court in the future. And as I said earlier, if other discovery along the way raises the issue of the relevance of the Bobcat project documents, Ford is free to revisit that issue with the Court at a future time.

1 So with that, I think that concludes all of the 2 issues that were put before the Court today. My rulings, as 3 I said earlier, are governed by Rule 72(a). Are there any further issues from Ford that I 4 5 haven't addressed? MS. CLAYTON: No, Your Honor. You've addressed 6 7 all the issues for Ford. THE COURT: Okay. Any further issues from the 8 9 plaintiffs? 10 MR. O'CONNELL: No, Your Honor. Thank you very 11 much. 12 THE COURT: Thank you. That concludes our 13 teleconference. I'm disconnecting, counsel. Have a good 14 day. (Everyone said, Thank you, Your Honor.) 15 (Teleconference was concluded at 3:00 p.m.) 16 17 I hereby certify the foregoing is a true and 18 accurate transcript from my stenographic notes in the 19 proceeding. 20 /s/ Heather M. Triozzi Official Merit Reporter 21 U.S. District Court 22 23 24 25